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I.

INTRODUCTION

Almost all of the discussion in the secondary literature concerning
restitutionary remedies deals with, what might be labeled as, two-party cases.
That is, the typical restitution claim arises in a situation where the claimant
has conferred value on a defendant, which the claimant asserts it is unjust for
the defendant to retain. Those who follow the American or Restatement1
model for the structure of the law of restitution also would include, as part of
this subject, two-party cases in which the defendant has become enriched by
dealings with third parties, which constitute a breach of a duty owed to the
claimant. A prime and simple example would be the breach of a fiduciary

*

F.R.S.C., University Professor and Professor Emeritus, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University,
Toronto.
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT (AM. LAW. INST. 2011)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT THIRD]; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION, QUASI-CONTRACTS, AND
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS (AM. LAW. INST. 1937) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT FIRST].
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obligation owed by the defendant to the claimant which is constituted by
dealings with third parties which have generated a profit in the hands of the
defendant. Though one could obviously characterize these as “three-party”
situations, in the sense that the source of the defendant’s unjust enrichment
is a third party, I will not do so for present purposes on the basis that these
are situations in which the unjust retention directly results from the
wrongdoing of the defendant who has breached a duty owed to the plaintiff.
The present topic concerns three-party situations in a rather different
sense. These are situations where a third party has transferred value to the
defendant, which, for reasons of justice, ought to have been or should now
be transferred to the plaintiff. As we shall see, such cases may or may not
involve wrongful conduct by the third party. Where the value has been
transferred to the defendant, however, the plaintiff might be said to have a
better claim to the enrichment than does the defendant. These types of cases
are much less discussed in the literature and, I suspect, much less familiar to
the profession at large. Nonetheless, there are, both historically and in
contemporary circumstances, many cases of this kind and their proper
resolution as a matter of some interest.
This paper will examine the traditional English position concerning such
claims and contrast that doctrine with more recent developments in American
and Canadian restitutionary doctrine. The principal point of comparison is
that American and Canadian doctrine allows restitutionary relief in a much
broader range of three-party cases. With particular reference to Canadian
doctrine, it is of interest that there appear to be a substantial number of
Canadian cases providing relief in situations quite similar to those found in
American law. This appears to be the case notwithstanding the fact that there
is no obvious evidence of American influence in the sense of reliance on
American authorities in the development of Canadian law in three-party
cases.
A complication found in Canadian law finds no parallel in American
doctrine and, for a time at least, threatened to preclude a recovery in at least
some three-party cases. Nonetheless, a recent Supreme Court of Canada
decision, Moore v. Sweet,2 to be further considered below, has flatly rejected
this possibility, and it now appears that Canadian and American doctrine run
along quite similar lines. This might be considered to be some evidence in
support of the proposition that there is merit in the position taken in the
American and Canadian cases which, in turn, might provide a basis for
reconsideration of some aspects of English doctrine.
The paradigm two-party case, for pedagogical purposes at least, is the
simple case of a mistaken payment. The claimant has paid money to the
defendant as a result of a mistake of some kind. For centuries, the common
2

Moore v. Sweet, [2018] S.C.R. 52 (Can.).
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law has allowed recovery subject, at least in more recent years in English and
Canadian experience, to the ability of the defendant to raise a change of
position defense. It may well be that the paradigm case for a practitioner, in
the sense that it is the type of case more frequently encountered, is the transfer
of value under an agreement which is unenforceable for some reason. In such
cases, benefits conferred through contractual performance are usually,
though not invariably, recoverable. The simple mistaken payment claim,
however, has the appeal of simplicity for analytical purposes. To consider the
prospect of a three-party claim in the context of a mistaken payment, one may
imagine that the mistake in question has the effect of inducing the payer to
make the payment to the wrong party. The question to be considered here,
then, is whether the party who should have received the payment is entitled
to bring a restitution claim against the party who actually did receive the
payment. We may note in passing that, in the making of the payment, neither
the third party, the mistaken payer, nor the recipient defendant have engaged
in the breach of a duty owed to the plaintiff, the intended recipient. It is well
established, of course, that the mistaken payer has a claim against the
recipient. It is much less clear in English and Canadian law whether the
intended recipient has such a claim.
II. THE TRADITIONAL ENGLISH POSITION
The unifying theme of traditional English law on restitutionary remedies
in three-party situations is that relief is typically available only where the
third party has obtained a benefit from the claimant through wrongful
conduct of some kind and has then passed it on to the defendant. Such claims
have been recognized both at common law and in equity, and the following
brief synopsis3 will therefore distinguish between common law and equitable
claims.
At common law, relief is typically afforded in circumstances where a
third party has misappropriated funds from the claimant and has, in some
fashion, passed it on to the third party. In some cases, the misappropriation
may amount to theft. In others, it may constitute a breach of contract or the
tort of conversion. Where the miscreant is an employee of the claimant, the
misappropriation may amount to a wrong of all three kinds. A leading
eighteenth century authority may come within this category. In Clarke v.
Shee & Johnson,4 the plaintiff brewer had an employee, his clerk, who had
diverted sums intended for the employer that had come into his possession in
the ordinary course of business. The employee then paid the misappropriated
3 For more extensive treatment, see ANDREW BURROWS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 19 (3d ed.
Oxford University Press 2011); P.D. MADDAUGH & J.D. MCCAMUS, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION ch. 36
(looseleaf ed. 2019).
4

Clarke v. Shee & Johnson (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1041.
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funds to the defendant in return for lottery tickets. The latter transaction was
unlawful under the legislation then applicable to lotteries. Lord Mansfield,
with three concurrences, allowed a “money had and received” claim by the
employer against the supplier of the lottery tickets on the basis that the
common law claim in money had and received, rather like a bill in equity,
would lie where it was against “conscience” that the defendant retained the
sums in question.5 It was significant that the transaction between the
employee and the defendant was unlawful as otherwise, the Court observed,
the defendant would be able to raise a bona fide purchaser defense. Lord
Mansfield did observe that the claimant was the “true owner” of the funds.6
Accordingly, it has long been assumed that such claims would lie only where
a proprietary link could be established between the claimant and the funds
transferred to the defendant. The recovery, it should be noted, is nonetheless
personal in nature rather than proprietary.
The concern to establish a proprietary connection concerning the
transferred assets is also evident in the leading modern English authority,
Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd.7 Again, the claim concerned funds
misappropriated by the third party. In this case, the third party was a partner,
a Mr. Cass, in the plaintiff firm of solicitors who misappropriated partnership
funds and spent the money (and lost most of it) gambling at a facility operated
by the defendant in London, known as the “Playboy Club.” The firm sought
restitution of the funds gambled away by Cass from the Club. The principal
significance of this decision for this area of the law is that it was the occasion
on which the House of Lords first plainly recognized the existence of a
change of position defense. In granting relief, based on the Clarke v. Shee &
Johnson line of authority, the Court satisfied itself that the transactions at the
Playboy Club were unenforceable, thus depriving the defendant of a bona
fide purchaser defense. As Cass’s gambling activity was not completely
unsuccessful, he had enjoyed some winnings. The House of Lords applied a
change of position defense in the defendant’s favour with respect to the
monies it had paid out to Mr. Cass.8
Establishing a proprietary link between the funds misappropriated from
the firm by Cass and the monies paid to the Playboy Club and, further, by the
firm to the monies still remaining in the hands of the Playboy Club would
have been a challenging exercise. Nonetheless, the House of Lords appeared
to assume that it was necessary to establish that the firm retained title to the
funds advanced by Cass to the Playboy Club. Cass had also spent some of his
own resources in gambling at the Playboy Club. Whether or not a mixing had

5

Id. at 1041–42.

6

Id. at 1042.

7

See Lipkin Gorman v. Karpnale Ltd. [1991] A.C. 548 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.).

8

Id. at 579.
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occurred was apparently unclear but, if it had occurred, it would have
complicated a tracing exercise. The matter was satisfactorily resolved,
however, by the defendant’s concession that the plaintiff retained title to the
monies advanced to the club by Cass. To the extent it might have been
necessary to demonstrate that the club had retained or been enriched by the
firm’s monies, a number of complications could have arisen. Apart from the
question of Cass mixing the firm’s monies with his own, it was the Club’s
practice to issue chits in return for monies advanced by customers and then
to cash out whatever chits remained in the hands of gamblers at the end of
their gambling sessions. Further, it was apparently the practice of Cass to
spend his winnings in further gambling at the Club. Again, these difficulties
were resolved by a concession made by the Club that a specific amount of
money, in their view, constituted the surplus retained by the Club after
making appropriate deductions to account for these complexities.9 With these
matters resolved, Lord Goff was able to conclude that the Clarke precedent
was controlling and that the firm was entitled to recover the amount in
question from the defendant Club. Lord Goff observed that the club “cannot
in conscience retain the money—or, as we say nowadays, for the third party
to retain the money would result in his unjust enrichment at the expense of
the owner of the money.”10
In summary, then, the common law doctrine allows the recovery of
monies misappropriated from a claimant by a third party who then passes on
the funds in question to the eventual defendant, provided that the defendant
cannot raise a defense of bona fide purchase or of change of position. It
remains contentious in English law, however, whether such recovery is
limited to situations in which a claimant can establish a proprietary
connection to the funds eventually transferred to the defendant by the third
party. Another possible view is that this would be merely one way of
establishing that the benefit acquired by the defendant had been “at the
expense” of the claimant but that it might not necessarily be the only way of
doing so. Thus, for example, on the Lipkin Gorman facts, it might have been
possible to establish that, but for the misappropriation, Cass could not have
afforded to gamble as enthusiastically as he did at the Club. Indeed, it may
be that an assumption of this kind provided a basis for the Club’s concession
on the matter.
On the equity side, the principal vehicle for imposing liability on remote
recipients of wrongfully acquired benefits is the law of fiduciary obligation.
The two doctrines achieving this objective are usually referred to as
“knowing assistance” and “knowing receipt.” Of the two, it is the latter that
is particularly of present interest. The doctrine of “knowing assistance”

9
10

Id. at 569.
Id. at 572.
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imposes liability on third parties who have, in some fashion, participated in
a breach of fiduciary obligation either by facilitating the misconduct or by
inducing it. Essentially, then, it is a form of accessory liability and is not, in
fact, dependent on establishing that the defendant received any trust assets as
a result of his conduct. The doctrine of “knowing receipt,” on the other hand,
is applicable to a defendant who is the recipient of trust assets
misappropriated by the third party by means of a breach of fiduciary
obligation. The remedy in “knowing receipt” cases then is plainly
restitutionary in nature. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Canada, in a modern
leading case, held that the doctrine of “knowing receipt” is to be included
within the law of unjust enrichment.11
By way of distinguishing the two different forms of liability, it might be
said that the doctrine of “knowing assistance” is “fault-based”; whereas, the
doctrine of “knowing receipt” might be said to be “receipt-based.” On the
other hand, both doctrines might be considered to involve an element of fault
inasmuch as, in each case, it must be established that there is some form of
knowledge or awareness on the part of the defendant that a fiduciary breach
has occurred. To establish a claim of “knowing assistance,” the plaintiff must
establish that the plaintiff had “actual knowledge” of the circumstances
giving rise to the breach of fiduciary obligation. In a “knowing receipt” case,
however, the knowledge required is of a lesser standard. It is said that in a
case of “knowing receipt,” the defendant must have had constructive
knowledge of the breach of fiduciary obligation, that is “knowledge of
circumstances which would indicate the facts to an honest person, or
knowledge of facts which would put an honest person on inquiry.”12
In a knowing receipt claim, then, the plaintiff must establish
constructive knowledge on the part of the defendant recipient. Further, the
plaintiff must establish that the benefit transferred to the defendant
constituted an asset of the claimant.13 That is to say, it is plainly established
that in this context a proprietary link between the claimant’s asset and the
asset received by the recipient is a necessary pre-requisite to recovery.
Further, it must be established that the recipient acquired the claimant’s asset
for the recipient’s personal use. Thus, it would not be sufficient for the
recipient to have received the asset as an agent for another party.
The need for a proprietary link in “knowing receipt” cases provides an
explanation for the fact that the normal remedy made available in such cases
is that of constructive trust. In this respect, the equitable doctrine differs from
the doctrine at common law. At common law, as we have noted, the remedy
11

Citadel Gen. Assurance Co. v. Lloyds Bank Can., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 805 (Can.).

12

Air Can. v. M & L Travel Ltd., [1993] 3 S.C.R. 787, 812 (Can.); see Citadel Gen. Assurance, 3
S.C.R. at para. 22.
13 MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, The Elements of “Knowing Receipt”, in THE LAW OF RESTITUTION,
supra note 3, at cmt. 36, heading 36:300.20.
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is personal in nature even though, albeit with some contention, recovery at
common law rests on establishing a proprietary connection between the
plaintiff and the assets transferred ultimately to the defendant.
In summary, then, both at common law and in equity, restitution is
allowed in three-party cases where the claimant’s assets have been
misappropriated by a third party and then passed on by the third party to the
defendant. The common law cases deal essentially with cases of breach of
contract, theft, and tortious misconduct by the third party. The equity cases
deal principally with breach of fiduciary obligation. We should notice that
both of these doctrines are of no assistance in our paradigm case of a mistaken
payment. Where monies have been mistakenly paid by A to B when, in fact,
A actually intended to pay the monies to C, B has not engaged in wrongful
conduct resulting in the receipt of the mistakenly paid monies. Thus, there is
no basis for a restitutionary three-party claim by C against B under these
common law and equity doctrines. Oddly, however, there is one lonely
instance in which C can recover from B monies mistakenly paid by A to B
and that is in the context of estates administration. In the famous case of Re
Diplock,14 the executors of the rather large estate of one Caleb Diplock,
mistakenly interpreted the will and distributed large amounts of money to as
many as 139 different charities, including numerous hospitals and schools.
An action brought by the next of kin, who were the proper recipients of the
monies in question, against the charities, enjoyed success. In other words, in
a case where the executors mistakenly paid monies to a group of defendants,
the intended recipients of the monies were granted a direct claim against the
improper recipients. Thus far, however, English law has not generalized the
proposition evidently applied in Diplock and recognized that there exists a
general rule that in a mistaken payment case, the intended recipient of the
monies paid can bring a restitution claim against the unintended recipient.
In the English law of restitution relating to third party cases, then, there
remain some interesting points of difficulty. First, both at common law and
in equity, it may be asked whether it is appropriate, as a matter of principle,
to require a proprietary link between the claimant and the assets received by
the defendant. That is, should it be necessary to show that the claimant is the
owner of the assets so received whether at common law or in equity. Second,
it may be asked whether the rule in Re Diplock ought to be extended to
mistaken payment cases more generally. Third, the requirement of
constructive notice in “knowing receipt” cases remains contentious. With
respect to the latter point, there is now an extended debate in the academic
literature as to whether constructive notice ought to be required in such cases.
We may note that there is no such requirement in common law three-party

14 Diplock v. Wintle (Re Diplock), [1950] 2 All ER 1137 (Can. H.L.), aff’d sub nom. Ministry of
Health v. Simpson [1951] AC 251 (HL).
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cases. Thus, there is no requirement in a case like Clarke v. Shee and
Johnson15 that the supplier of the lottery tickets was aware that the monies
used to pay for them were misappropriated by the brewer’s clerk. Those who
favour “strict” liability as a general matter, including in “knowing receipt”
cases, make the argument that the legitimate interests of the recipient in threeparty cases are adequately protected by the bona fide purchaser and change
of position defenses. These defenses are, of course, recognized at common
law and may be thought to provide a principled basis for imposing strict
liability in that context. If one asks what the legitimate interests of the
recipient of monies might be in such cases, they would appear to be precisely
analogous to the interests of a recipient of mistakenly paid monies. If the
recipient had received the monies under a valid transaction, there is obviously
an interest in protecting the sanctity or integrity of such transactions. This
interest of the defendant is adequately protected, however, by the bona fide
purchaser defense. Further, the recipient who lacks knowledge of the problem
relating to the initial acquisition of the funds has an interest in not suffering
as a result of detrimental reliance on the receipt of the monies. This interest,
of course, is adequately protected by the change of position defense. There
does not appear to be a need for any additional protection to the interests of
recipients in the context of knowing receipt. Accordingly, it is argued, the
strict liability applicable in common law should be extended into the equity
context, provided that both the bone fide purchase and change of position
defenses are recognized as being available in the equity context.16 Such
arguments, however, have not yet had an influence on the English law of
knowing receipt.
III. EXPANDING THE SCOPE OF SUCH RELIEF: AMERICAN AND
CANADIAN CASES
For purposes of concision, I will simply assume, without further
documentation, that remedies that would be available in three-party cases
covered by traditional English doctrine are also available in both American
and Canadian law. Of greater interest, however, are situations in which
recovery would be available in Canadian17 and American18 jurisprudence
where there appears to be no parallel in English law. A brief sketch of such
cases will be provided here.
15

Clarke v. Shee & Johnson (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1041.

16

See, e.g., Peter Birks, Misdirected Funds: Restitution from the Recipient, LLOYD’S MAR. &
COM. L.Q. 296 (1989); Lord Nicholls, Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark, in RESTITUTION:
PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 231 (W.R. Cornish et al. eds., Oxford, Hart Pub., 1998); cf. Rohan Havelock,
The Transformation of Knowing Receipt, 22 REST. L. REV. 1 (2014).
17

See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 3, cmt. 35.

18

For more extensive treatment, see RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at vol. 2, ch. 6.
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The Restatement Third brings together comprehensively, perhaps for the
first time, three-party cases of the kind under consideration here. Section 48
articulates a general principle underlying these cases in the following form:
“Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better
Right.”
If a third person makes a payment to the defendant in which
(as between claimant and defendant) the claimant has a
better legal or equitable right, the claimant is entitled in
restitution from the defendant as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment.
The cases gathered together as illustrations of this principle or rule may
be conveniently subdivided into a number of headings, many of which may
overlap to some extent. A brief synopsis with American and Canadian
illustrations follows.
A. Claimant Has Borne an Expense for Which the Defendant Has
Been Reimbursed
A typical example falling within this category arises in circumstances
where tax payments are reimbursed for some reason by the taxing authority,
but are not reimbursed to the party who had actually paid or borne the burden
of the tax in the first place. A simple illustration based on American
authority19 involves the collection and reimbursement of federal taxes on
products provided to consumers. The supplier charges the applicable tax to
the customer and remits it to the federal authority. Subsequent litigation
involving other taxpayers results in a decision that the particular product is
not properly considered to be subject to the tax. The federal authority then
remits tax payments to payers, including the particular supplier. The
customer, who had actually borne the burden of the tax, is able to seek
restitution of the taxes reimbursed from the supplier. A similar Canadian
case20 involved the payment of taxes on building materials by a general
contractor, as was required by the building contract. The employer of the
contractor was a university. When subsequent federal legislation reimbursed
universities with respect to taxes paid on building materials, the general
contractor successfully brought a restitution claim against the university for
the taxes paid by the contractor and subsequently reimbursed to the
university.

19

See Wayne Cty. Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott Co., 155 N.E. 669 (N.Y. 1927).

20

See James More & Sons Ltd. v. Univ. of Ottawa (1975), 5 O.R. 2d 162 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.).
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Another Canadian authority21 indicates that this proposition extends
beyond the context of tax reimbursements. A supplier of parts to the
manufacturer of equipment to be supplied by the manufacturer to a third party
had completed work in progress by the time the contract between the
manufacturer and the third party unexpectedly terminated. Under that
agreement, the manufacturer was entitled to compensation for work in
progress. The manufacturer claimed, as part of the work in progress, the work
performed by the parts supplier. The parts supplier successfully sought
restitution of the amounts reimbursed to the manufacturer that related to the
otherwise uncompensated work in progress of the parts supplier.
B. Defendant Intercepts Benefits Pertaining to Proprietary or Other
Entitlements of the Claimant
Historically, there are a number of lines of authority, including English
authority, dealing with situations where the defendant has acquired a benefit,
typically money, that pertains in some sense to ownership rights or other
forms of entitlement of the claimant. A simple illustration relates to
misdirected rental payments.22 Thus, if A mistakenly pays rent to B, thinking
that B is the owner of the property, whereas, in fact, C is the owner of the
property, C has a good restitutionary claim against B for the monies received.
Similar issues may arise in the context of co-ownership of land and, again,
lines of authority allowing recovery are found in all jurisdictions.23 Other
venerable lines of authority relate to claims of office holders who are entitled
to certain fees or profits in cases where such monies are collected by usurpers
of those offices. Similarly, in the context of estates administration, one who
purports to collect monies owing to deceased on behalf of the estate must
account for the monies received to the duly appointed representatives of the
estate.24
Cases that are not covered by the traditional authorities often arise in the
context of transfers of ownership. In a Canadian case,25 an owner of real
property contested a municipal tax assessment. Before that application was
resolved, however, the owner sold the property to the defendant. After the
closing of the transaction, it was decided by the appropriate authority that a

21

See Stevested Mach. & Eng’g Ltd. v. Metso Paper Ltd. (2014), 372 D.L.R. 4th 112 (Can. B.C.

C.A.).
22

Arris v. Stukeley (1677) 86 Eng. Rep. 1060 (KB).

23

See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 3, at heading 35:500 “Defendant Intercepts Benefits
Pertaining to Proprietary or Other Entitlements of the Claimant”; RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at
vol. 2, 129–44.
24 See MADDAUGH & MCCAMUS, supra note 3, at heading 35:500 “Defendant Intercepts Benefits
Pertaining to Proprietary or Other Entitlements of the Claimant.”
25

80 Mornelle Props. Inc. v. Malla Props. Ltd. (2010), 327 D.L.R. 4th 361 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
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tax refund was payable. Under the applicable legislation, the refund was
payable to the registered owner of the land. That person was, of course, the
purchaser. The former owner successfully sought restitution of the refund
from the purchaser. Similarly, a vendor who, after closing, receives benefits
accruing to the owner of the property would be liable to account for such
receipts to the new owner and American authority so holds.26
C. Recovery by the Intended Recipient of Money Mistakenly Paid to a
Third Party
As we have seen, English law allows recovery by the intended recipient
of monies mistakenly paid to a third party where, in the context of estates
administration, the executors have mistakenly paid the wrong party. In such
circumstances, the intended beneficiary is entitled to recover from the
recipient. English law does not, however, recognize a more general
proposition of this kind relating to mistaken payments. American law, on the
other hand, has granted relief in such cases well beyond the context of estates
administration. Indeed, a rule to this effect was stated in the original 1937
Restatement in section 126.27 The authorities relied upon, as support for the
Restatement section, deal with situations where the mistaken assumption, if
true, would render the plaintiff liable to make the payment in question. Thus,
the payer, thinking that he is obligated to pay A, whereas he is in fact liable
to pay B, pays A by mistake. In such circumstances, B is entitled to recover
from A the mistaken payment. A great variety of authorities are cited in
support of this section. They deal, for example, with cases in which a
judgment debtor on a claim which is subject to an attorney’s lien pays the
judgment creditor. In such a case, the creditor is directly liable to the
attorney.28 In another case, the maker of a note mistakenly paid the defendant
instead of the holder.29 The holder has a direct claim against the recipient. A
payment is mistakenly made to the mortgagor rather than the mortgagee, and
so on.30 There do not appear to be Canadian authorities to the same effect.
D. Failed Arrangements to Allocate Assets Following Family
Dissolution
There are numerous Canadian and American authorities dealing with
situations in which a married or co-habiting couple make arrangements upon
26

King Cty. v. Odman, 111 P.2d 228, 230 (Wash. 1941).

27

RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 1, at § 126.

28

Sibley v. Cty. of Pine, 17 N.W. 337, 338 (Minn. 1883).

29

Ind. Nat’l Bank v. Holtsclaw, 98 Ind. 85, 88 (1884).

30

Palo v. Rogers, 165 A. 803, 805 (Conn. 1933).
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the dissolution of their relationship with respect to the allocation of particular
assets—typically insurance or pension benefits—which are then not properly
implemented. Thus, it might be agreed that upon dissolution of their
relationship, the initial spouse or partner will remain entitled to life insurance
benefits. In breach of those arrangements, the insured might designate a new
person, typically a new co-habitant, to be the beneficiary of the policy. Upon
the death of the insured, the proceeds become payable to the new partner.
The former spouse or partner seeks restitution of the proceeds from the
recipient. In other cases, the failed implementation might result from a
mistake of some kind on the part of the insured or the pensioner. Thus, the
insured might have ineffectively attempted to carry out an undertaking or an
intention to transfer the insurance benefits to a new partner. As a result of the
failed attempt at implementation, the benefits are payable to the former
spouse. The former category of case might be characterized as an intentional
breach of an undertaking. The latter category will often be a mistake case in
the sense that the failed implementation will be accidental rather than
intentional.
There is well established American31 and Canadian authority allowing
relief in the breach of undertaking context. The recent and now leading
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. Sweet32 is a case of this
kind. The plaintiff Michelle Moore was married to Lawrence Moore for more
than 20 years. They had three children. In the course of the marriage, in light
of Lawrence’s unstable employment history and other personal problems, the
parties agreed that Lawrence should take out a life insurance policy naming
Michelle as beneficiary in order to provide some financial security to
Michelle in the event of his passing. Such a policy was taken out by
Lawrence. Upon the dissolution of their relationship, Lawrence agreed to
maintain Michelle as the beneficiary of the policy and Michelle, in return,
undertook to pay the premiums. Michelle did so only to discover, upon
Lawrence’s passing, that he had breached his undertaking and named his new
co-habitant, Risa Sweet, as the “irrevocable beneficiary” of the policy. The
Supreme Court of Canada, reversing the judgment below of the Ontario Court
of Appeal, granted Michelle’s claim against Risa Sweet for the proceeds of
the policy. There are several American authorities to the same effect.33
Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Moore v. Sweet,
the leading Canadian authority on point dealt with the second type of
situation identified above, that is, a mistaken failure to implement an
intention to change the beneficiary of a life insurance policy. In Roberts v.
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See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at § 48, illus. 22–26.
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Moore v. Sweet (2018), 430 D.L.R. 4th 315 (Can. S.C.C.).
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See RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at § 48, illus. 22.
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Martindale,34 the contest was between the former spouse of the deceased and
the deceased’s sister. Upon the dissolution of the marriage, the parties had
agreed that the husband would relinquish any interest in the estate of his wife.
The couple had separated after a lengthy marriage after the deceased became
ill. The sister of the deceased cared for her during her illness, and it was the
intention of the deceased to confer the benefits of a group life insurance
policy upon her. Not only was this her intention, but she thought she had
undertaken the necessary steps to achieve this objective. In this she was
mistaken, and the benefits remained payable to her husband. Nonetheless, the
Manitoba Court of Appeal held that the sister was entitled to impose a
constructive trust on the benefits inasmuch as “justice and good
conscience”35 so required. In the Court’s view, it was of some significance
that the husband had surrendered any rights he might have to the property of
the deceased. The problem arises, then, not from a breach of undertaking by
the former spouse but, rather, from a failure by the deceased to successfully
implement her intention to transfer value to her sister. When considered as a
mistaken transfer of value, the Richardson case appears to be quite analogous
to the mistaken payment problem.
In summary, then, there are a number of Canadian and American
authorities providing for restitutionary relief in the context of three-party
situations which do not appear to be covered by traditional English doctrine.
Generalizations about such cases are not easily articulated. Perhaps one can
do no better than the generalization offered in section 48 of Restatement
Third to the effect that a benefit has been conferred upon the defendant by a
third party in circumstances where “(as between claimant and defendant) the
claimant has a better legal or equitable right to the payment in question.”36
For present purposes, however, two important points may be noted. First, it
is very often the case that there is no proprietary right to the money or other
benefits transferred in the claimant to the money or other benefits transferred
to the defendant. Thus, the claim to reimbursements paid to defendants in
circumstances where the claimant initially bore the expense arises not from
a proprietary right but rather from a moral obligation. Second, it is typically
the case that the defendant has no knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
circumstances giving rise to the nature of the plaintiff’s claim. Thus, there is
no suggestion in Moore v. Sweet, for example, that Ms. Sweet was aware of
the arrangements Lawrence had made with his former wife.
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Roberts v. Martindale (1998), 162 D.L.R. 4th 475 (Can. B.C. C.A.).
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Id. at para. 24.
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RESTATEMENT THIRD, supra note 1, at vol. 2, § 47. Section 47 deals with claims to recover
payments made to the defendant with respect to claimant’s property. Id. This is said to be an illustration
of the broader principle set out in Section 48. See id. at cmt. a.
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IV. THREE-PARTY CASES AND THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT
PRINCIPLE
The unjust enrichment principle, as articulated in Restatement First,
holds that “[a] person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of
another is required to make restitution to the other.”37 There is a risk, in
Canadian and English jurisprudence at least, that literal or rigid interpretation
and application of that principle will create unnecessary difficulties in threeparty cases. A literal interpretation and application of the element of “at the
expense of,” would exclude some three-party cases from coverage by the
principle. Thus, in Moore v. Sweet,38 for example, the monies were paid to
Risa Sweet by the insurer and not by the claimant Michelle Moore. If “at the
expense of” is interpreted narrowly or literally as meaning at the “out-ofpocket” expense of the plaintiff, this element is not present on these facts.
Similarly, in the tax reimbursement cases, it might be argued that the
reimbursement is “at the expense of” the taxing authority rather than the
plaintiff. This is clearly not a problem or potential problem in American law.
It is obvious from the contents of the Restatement First, that the unjust
enrichment principle was not being interpreted so literally and further that it
was not the case that its authors were of the view that all of the lines of
authority collected in Restatement First could be explained on the basis of
the unjust enrichment principle if it were to be narrowly construed in this
fashion. Thus, the Restatement First includes all of the law of fiduciary
obligation even though, in some cases at least, profits or benefits acquired
through breach of fiduciary duty may not be at the expense of the plaintiff in
this narrow sense.39 Obviously, the terms “restitution” and “unjust
enrichment” were being used somewhat loosely by the Restatement’s authors
to capture all cases of benefits unjustly retained by a defendant (whether or
not they were directly acquired from the pocket of the plaintiff).
The risk that narrow interpretation of “at the expense of” the plaintiff
might cause difficulty in three-party cases is largely attributable to the work
of the late Professor Peter Birks. Although Birks’ views on these definitional
issues evolved over time, in the latest version of his views—written, some
would say, in his “more dogmatic and less compelling”40 phase—Birks
pronounced that “unjust enrichment” could only be properly understood if
“at the expense of” was narrowly and literally interpreted to refer only to
cases where value had been transferred from the plaintiff to the defendant.41
37

RESTATEMENT FIRST, supra note 1, at vol. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
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Indeed, it was his view that the loose usage of the concept had essentially
“wrecked”42 the project of Seavey and Scott in writing the Restatement First
of “Restitution.” They had incorrectly included both cases of direct transfer
together with cases of what Birks would refer to as “restitution for wrongs”
which, as in the case of fiduciary obligation, include both direct transfers and
cases where the defendant has acquired benefits from third parties. Thus, for
Birks, the subject-matter of Restatement First can only be properly
understood if it is subdivided into a number of new branches of the law. The
first would be true “unjust enrichment,” and the second would be “restitution
for wrongs.” As, in his view, not all of the restitution cases were embraced
by these two new branches of the law, there needed to be a third—tentatively
titled “Miscellaneous”—under which the left-overs would be gathered
together.43 It is not necessary to explore these eccentric views further for
present purposes. The critical point is that there is an element of English
thinking and writing about unjust enrichment that treats the concept rather
narrowly as applicable only to cases involving direct transfers from plaintiff
to defendant and, as Canadian experience demonstrates, such thinking could
create difficulties in the analysis of three-party cases.
Canadian experience on this point is complicated by the fact that in a
leading case,44 and for reasons that remain unclear, Judge Dickson, a future
Chief Justice of Canada, articulated the unjust enrichment principle
idiosyncratically as involving three elements—a benefit to the defendant, a
“corresponding deprivation” to the plaintiff, and “no juristic reason” for the
transfer.45 We will return below to the “no juristic reason” element. With
respect to the “at the expense of” element, however, we note that Judge
Dickson substituted the concept of “corresponding deprivation” of the
plaintiff. This re-working of “at the expense of” appears to call for a narrow
or literal restriction of recovery to cases where benefits have been transferred
directly from plaintiffs to defendants. As suggested above, such a restriction
could pose problems in three-party cases and such problems have, indeed,
surfaced in the Canadian jurisprudence.
Thus, in Moore v. Sweet46 itself, the defendant argued that the benefits
were conferred upon the defendant Sweet, not by the plaintiff Michelle
Moore but by the insurer. Hence, there was no “corresponding deprivation”

42 Peter Birks, A Letter to America: A New Restatement of Restitution, 3 GLOBAL JURIST
FRONTIERS 2 (2003).
43 PETER BIRKS, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 22 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2005) (mentioning only
negotiorum gestio and maritime salvage as possible components of this new branch of the law but
declining to enumerate further “since to enumerate all of its members requires encyclopedic erudition”).
Unsurprisingly, a treatise on “miscellaneous” has not yet materialized.
44
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to the plaintiff. An argument to this effect appeared to enjoy some success
below in the Ontario Court of Appeal.47 Fortunately, the Supreme Court of
Canada reversed and took a broader view of the concept of “corresponding
deprivation.” In the Court’s view, it was sufficient to establish a
“corresponding deprivation” that the benefits that had accrued to the
defendant would or should otherwise have accrued to the plaintiff. This was
obviously the case in Moore v. Sweet, and the corresponding deprivation test
was met. Were it not for the third party’s breach of undertaking, Michelle
would have received the proceeds. Her “deprivation” was the failure to
receive them. A similar analysis should apply, presumably, to a court
interpreting the traditional wording of the “at the expense of” elements.
Turning to the Canadian “no juristic reason” test, this element may also
create difficulty in three-party cases. Parenthetically, we may note that the
source of this element remains quite obscure. It is not found in the law of
other jurisdictions or in the academic literature. It obviously is designed to
replace the “unjust” element in the unjust enrichment principle. It seems
possible—indeed I think it is likely—that Judge Dickson was attempting to
assure his colleagues, whose scepticism about unjust enrichment was
evident,48 that he was not simply invoking abstract notions of “justice” or
“injustice” but was, rather, relying on a more precise or at least more lawyerly
principle of absence of “juristic reason.” The problem, of course, is that
“absence of juristic reason” is not a particularly precise or helpful notion. It
obviously embraces the well-known concepts that benefits transferred as a
gift or under a binding agreement or because the transfer is required by law
are not recoverable. It must be said, however, that this is a rather obscure way
of referring to them. But, beyond these well-known categories of “juristic
reason” for a transfer, it is not at all clear what the concept means. In the
three-party context, there is a risk that where the third party was directed by
a statute or agreement to pay the defendant, relief might be denied on the
basis that the agreement or statute provided a “juristic reason” for the transfer.
Thus, in the tax reimbursement cases, the statute typically commands that the
defendant be paid. The problem is that the plaintiff bore the initial burden of
paying the tax. In the cohabitation/insurance cases, the insurance contract,
perhaps reinforced by statute, requires that the insurer pay the proceeds to the
defendant. This problem did in fact arise in Moore v. Sweet. The governing
statute clearly indicated that the insurer should pay the “irrevocable
beneficiary,” Ms. Sweet. Arguably the statute constituted a “juristic reason”
for the transfer and recovery should, therefore, be denied. This type of
argument had succeeded in earlier Canadian jurisprudence49 and in the Court
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Pettkus, 2 S.C.R. at 836 (Martland, J., dissenting) (“palm tree justice”).

49

See, e.g., Wilson v. Wysosk (2014), 98 E.T.R. 3d 298 (Can. B.C. S.C.).

2020]

Restitutionary Remedies in Three-Party Cases

81

of Appeal below.50 Fortunately, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected this
argument in Moore and held that such statutory arrangements would preclude
relief only in circumstances where the statute plainly indicated that it not only
required the payment to the defendant but clearly and unambiguously
excluded restitutionary relief to a person in the position of Michelle Moore.
In short, the existence of an explanation for the fact that the monies were paid
to the defendant does not necessarily create a “juristic reason” for the transfer
that precludes restitutionary relief. A similar analysis would apply,
presumably, to the tax reimbursement cases. In short, for Canadian purposes,
Moore v. Sweet appears to have solved the “juristic reason” problem in threeparty cases, enabling Canadian courts to achieve results similar to those
found in American jurisprudence.
V.

LESSONS FOR ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE FROM AMERICAN
AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCE

If one accepts the attractiveness of the results in Canadian and American
three-party restitution cases briefly canvassed above, it might be suggested
that there are a few lessons that could be carried into modification of the
traditional English position in cases of this kind.
First, these cases might be considered to lend support for the proposition
that liability in English three-party cases should generally be considered to
be strict. That is to say, there does not appear to be a convincing basis for
precluding liability in cases where the recipient is completely unaware of the
circumstances giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim, provided that the legitimate
interests of an innocent recipient are protected by the defenses of bona fide
purchase and change of position. Arguably, then, the constructive knowledge
requirement in “knowing receipt” cases should be abandoned.51
Second, it is abundantly clear from the Canadian and American cases
that no proprietary link is necessary in order to justify restitutionary relief in
three-party cases as a general matter. Many of these cases would involve
situations where, if it were not for the intervention of the third party, the asset
in question would have been acquired by the claimant. Thus, if Lawrence
Moore had not breached his undertaking to Michelle, the insurance benefits
would have been paid to her. As we have seen, the Supreme Court of Canada
held that this was sufficient to establish that the benefit acquired by Risa
50
51
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An alternative suggestion, achieving the same result, would be to reserve “knowing receipt” for
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recognize a simple restitution claim for assets received which would be strict in nature. In this view,
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Sweet was acquired “at the expense of” Michelle Moore, and in the current
Canadian jargon, at the “corresponding deprivation” of Michelle and thus
provided the basis for an unjust enrichment claim. One might argue, perhaps,
that in such circumstances funds transferred to Risa might be held in equity
for Michelle and, accordingly, that an equitable proprietary link is
established. At no point, however, did the Supreme Court suggest that
Michelle was the owner of the funds acquired by Risa. The claim would not
fail if the funds had been irretrievably mixed with the other funds by Risa.
But even this analysis is not applicable to other cases in which meritorious
claims have been allowed. Thus, in a typical tax reimbursement case, there is
nothing to suggest that the taxing authority should have reimbursed the
person who bore the burden of the tax. Nor is there any basis for suggesting
that the funds paid to the recipient are owned by the person who has actually
borne the burden of the tax. Nor do the courts granting recovery suggest that
there is a proprietary link of this kind. Recovery is allowed simply because
fairness requires that the monies be repaid to the person who initially bore
the burden of the expense in question. In short, the Canadian and American
cases offer some support for the proposition that a proprietary link between
the claimant and the asset received by the defendant should not be considered
to be an indispensable requirement in three-party cases.
Third, American experience strongly suggests that the rule in Re
Diplock ought to be generalized to deal with mistaken payments in a more
general way. American jurisprudence allows recovery by an intended
recipient more generally in circumstances where monies have been paid by
mistake to the wrong party. To be sure, the typical mistake in American threeparty mistaken payment cases involves a “liability mistake.” That is, the
payer mistakenly believes that he is liable to make the payment to the
recipient. It therefore may be asked whether the rule should be extended to
mistaken gratuitous transfers. Here, the Richardson Estate52 case may be of
some assistance. At bottom, Richardson is a case where a party mistakenly
makes a gift of insurance proceeds to one party in circumstances where they
had intended to effectuate a transfer of those benefits to a new party. It
appears to be the case in all three jurisdictions, that mistaken payments
intended as a gratuitous transfer can be recovered by the mistaken payer.53
There would appear to be no reason, in principle, why mistaken transfers in
three-party cases should not similarly be subject to restitutionary relief in
favour of the intended recipient of a mistaken gratuitous transfer.
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